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Tobias Adrian
Recent high correlations among hedge fund returns could suggest concentrations of risk comparable 
to those preceding the hedge fund crisis of 1998. A comparison of the current rise in correlations
with the elevation before the 1998 event, however, reveals a key difference. The current increase
stems mainly from a decline in the volatility of returns, while the earlier rise was driven by
high covariances—an alternative measure of comovement in dollar terms. Because volatility and 
covariances are lower today, the current hedge fund environment differs from the 1998 environment.
H
e edge funds—private investment partner-
ships that are not directly regulated—have
grown in importance in recent years. Total
assets under the management of hedge funds are currently
estimated at $1.5 trillion,and the funds contribute more than
half of average trading volume in equity and corporate bond
markets.1
While the funds are major liquidity providers in normal
times, their use of leveraged trading strategies has raised
concerns about their liquidity effects in times of market
stress. Indeed, the collapse of the hedge fund Long-Term
Capital Management (LTCM) in 1998 seemed to confirm fears
that heavy losses by hedge funds have the potential to drain
significant liquidity from key financial markets (Table 1).
These ongoing concerns about hedge fund vulnerability,
coupled with the rapid growth of the funds,underscore the
importance of understanding risk in this sector.
A key determinant of hedge fund risk is the degree of simi-
larity between the trading strategies of different funds.
Similar trading strategies can heighten risk when funds have
to close out comparable positions in response to a common
shock.For example,many funds had to close out positions
during the LTCM crisis to meet margin calls and satisfy risk
management constraints.
There are many ways to assess the similarity ofhedge fund
strategies. The approach taken in this edition of Current
Issues is to examine how closely together the funds’returns
move.If the returns of many funds are either high or low at
the same time,the funds could record losses simultaneously,
with possible adverse consequences for market liquidity and
stability.
One standard measure of the comovement of hedge fund
returns is covariance. The covariance across a group of funds
essentially captures the extent to which their returns move
together (or apart,in the case of negative covariance) in dollar
terms.A high covariance between two funds means that when
one earns a larger-than-normal amount of money,the other is
likely to do the same.However,it matters little if two funds
tend to gain or lose at the same time if such joint gains and
losses are only a small fraction of the funds’ total returns.
Therefore,analysts “normalize”this measure by dividing the
covariance of fund returns by the returns’ total variability.
This calculation tells us how closely hedge fund returns
move together relative to their overall volatility—a different
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measure of comovement known as correlation.While this meas-
ure is frequently used,it has a notable drawback: correlation
may change because its numerator (the returns’covariance) or
its denominator (the returns’volatility) changes. For instance,
the correlation of different funds’ returns may rise either
because the returns have moved more closely together (their
covariance has increased) or because their volatility has fallen.
As this article shows,the distinction is more than a mere
technicality: the correlation of hedge fund returns rose both in
the period prior to the LTCM crisis and in recent times—but
for different reasons.An increase in the comovement of dollar
returns was the leading cause of rising correlation in the 1990s,
but a decline in overall volatility explains the recent rise.
Complementing this result is our finding that high correla-
tions of returns generally do not precede increases in volatility
in the hedge fund sector,but high covariances among hedge
funds do.While the LTCM collapse was preceded by high corre-
lations and high covariances in an environment of increased
hedge fund return volatility,the current environment is charac-
terized by only average levels of covariances and low volatility.
Therefore,with respect to both volatility and covariance,the
current environment differs markedly from the one in the
months preceding the LTCM crisis.
The final part of our analysis compares hedge fund correla-
tions and volatilities during the LTCM crisis with equity return
correlations and volatilities.By the time the LTCM crisis broke
in August 1998,hedge fund return correlations had dropped
from their peak levels in 1996 and 1997 to a level that was not
particularly high.Some hedge fund strategies registered losses
while others gained.By contrast,equity return correlations and
volatilities increased sharply,a phenomenon known as finan-
cial market contagion.2 Thus,this episode provides evidence
that while returns on equities and similar financial assets tend
to move together during crises,returns on hedge funds tend to
react independently,reflecting the differences in hedge fund
exposures to various shocks.
Hedge Fund Strategies,Returns,and Correlations
Our study uses Credit Suisse/Tremont data on hedge fund
returns by trading strategy.This database has the advantage of
including the returns of large hedge funds that do not report to
the usual hedge fund databases.Trading strategies are classified
into ten groups according to asset class and investment style.3
The indexes are available monthly since January 1994—except
for Multi-Strategy,which is available since April 1994.
The data reveal that average returns and standard deviations
varied widely across hedge fund strategies during the 1994-2006
period (Table 2).The Global Macro strategy had a monthly aver-
age return of 1.11 percent while the return on Dedicated Short
Bias was -0.03 percent.Standard deviations—a measure of the
risk of a particular trading strategy—ranged from 0.84 percent,
suggesting relatively low risk,to 4.92 percent,pointing to greater
risk. The distribution of extreme returns also varied widely
across strategies. Emerging Markets experienced the largest
monthly decline,-23.03 percent,while Dedicated Short Bias had
the biggest monthly gain,22.71 percent.
Significantly,the data also show that correlations among hedge
funds were high over the 1994-2006 period (Table 3).The average
correlation of the ten strategies with the Credit Suisse/Tremont
Hedge Fund Index was 40 percent.Only the Dedicated Short Bias
strategy was negatively correlated with the index.
Hedge Fund Risk 
Risk is a critical component of hedge fund strategies,so the way
in which it is measured is extremely important.By analyzing
measures of risk across hedge funds, we seek to shed light 
2
1Credit Suisse First Boston,“Equity Research Sector Review:Hedge Funds and
Investment Banks,”March 9,2005.
2This type of financial market contagion among asset returns is well docu-
mented.See,for example,Claessens and Forbes (2001).
Table 1
1998 Timeline of the Long-Term Capital 
Management (LTCM) Crisis
Date Event
August 17  Ruble devaluation and moratorium on Russian bonds
September 2  LTCM warning to shareholders
September 22 Meeting of LTCM with banks at Federal Reserve Bank of New York
September 23  LTCM recapitalized by consortium of banks with $3.625 billion
September 29 Fed funds rate cut by 25 basis points,to 5.25 percent
October 15 Fed funds rate cut by 25 basis points,to 5 percent
November 17 Fed funds rate cut by 25 basis points,to 4.75 percent
Table 2
Summary Statistics for Hedge Fund Index Returns
January 1994 to September 2006
Standard
Strategy Mean Deviation Minimum Maximum Months
Hedge Fund Index 0.87 2.23 -7.55 8.53 153
Convertible Arbitrage 0.73 1.35 -4.68 3.57 153
Dedicated Short Bias -0.03 4.92 -8.69 22.71 153
Emerging Markets 0.81 4.65 -23.03 16.42 153
Equity Market Neutral 0.80 0.84 -1.15 3.26 153
Event Driven 0.92 1.61 -11.77 3.68 153
Fixed Income Arbitrage 0.52 1.07 -6.96 2.05 153
Global Macro 1.11 3.13 -11.55 10.60 153
Long/Short Equity 0.97 2.92 -11.44 13.01 153
Managed Futures 0.54 3.44 -9.35 9.95 153
Multi-Strategy 0.77 1.24 -4.76 3.61 150
Source:Author’s calculations,based on data from Credit Suisse/Tremont.
Notes:The table reports summary statistics for returns on Credit Suisse/Tremont hedge fund
strategies.The Multi-Strategy data begin in April 1994.
3The strategies are identified in Tables 2 and 3. For more details, visit
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on the evolution of risk in the hedge fund sector as a whole.
This approach is preferable to examining the riskiness of indi-
vidual funds or strategies because it yields more representative
results.
Cross-Sectional Dispersion of Returns
Our preferred measure of risk is the cross-sectional dispersion
of returns,which is the volatility of returns across funds at each
point in time (see box).4 One advantage of cross-sectional
volatility as an indicator of hedge fund risk is that it captures
the exact timing of spikes in risk.It can do so because it implic-
itly accounts for the variation of exposures over time to differ-
ent sources of systematic risk—the risk arising from common
movements in asset prices. This is an important advantage,
because hedge funds use dynamic trading strategies and 
hold derivatives,practices that lead to time-varying exposures
to systematic risk.5 By comparison, a common alternative
approach—gauging risk by calculating volatilities over twelve-
or twenty-four-month periods and then averaging across
funds—has the potential disadvantage of averaging periods 
of high and low volatility, making it difficult to determine 
the precise timing of shocks to risk.
A second advantage of the cross-sectional measure is that
it captures idiosyncratic risk—the risk unique to an individual
asset—as well as systematic risk. This feature is important
because shocks that are idiosyncratic in normal times can cause
much broader disruptions when intermediaries become finan-
cially constrained. For example, an idiosyncratic shock in
1998—the Russian default—became a threat to overall financial
stability because of the failure of LTCM.
According to our measure, cross-sectional volatility of
hedge fund returns peaked in August 1998,the month in which
the Russian default precipitated the LTCM crisis (Chart 1).
Volatility stood at 12.10 percent that month,nearly 7 standard
deviations above its mean of 2.66 percent (Table 4).September
and October 1998 also saw high volatility.However,over the
next twelve months,a rapid decline occurred.
Since 2001,hedge fund return volatility has declined substan-
tially.As Chart 1 shows,average volatility was 3.17 percent before
4From a statistical point of view, this measure of risk is technically not a
volatility,but (the square root of) a second moment.However,it captures both
the volatility of return innovations and the volatility of expected returns.
5For example,consider a fund that holds put options on an equity index.When
the put is “out of the money,”the sensitivity of the option with respect to the
underlying index is small.If the index declines and the value of the put increases,
the exposure of the put position to the index rises.The increase in exposure
heightens the volatility of the option,even though the decline in the equity index
may not be associated with a change in equity market volatility.
Table 3
Correlations of Returns by Hedge Fund Strategy
January 1994 to September 2006
Strategy Hedge Fund Index CA DSB EM EMN ED FIA GM LSE MF MS
Hedge Fund Index 100
Convertible Arbitrage (CA) 40 100
Dedicated Short Bias (DSB) -48 -24 100
Emerging Markets (EM) 66 31 -55 100
Equity Market Neutral (EMN) 32 33 -32 24 100
Event Driven (ED) 68 57 -63 66 38 100
Fixed Income Arbitrage (FIA) 41 53 -5 26 11 38 100
Global Macro (GM) 85 28 -12 42 20 38 42 100
Long/Short Equity (LSE) 79 27 -71 60 34 67 18 41 100
Managed Futures (MF) 17 -13 11 -7 13 -13 -5 27 3 100
Multi-Strategy (MS) 22 39 -10 2 24 22 30 14 21 4 100
Source:Author’s calculations,based on data from Credit Suisse/Tremont.
Notes:The table reports correlations across returns on Credit Suisse/Tremont hedge fund strategies.The Multi-Strategy data begin in April 1994.Figures are in percent.
Our preferred measure of risk is the cross-sectional disper-
sion of returns, defined as the volatility of returns across
funds at each point in time.
To construct this measure, we let i = 1,..., N index the
hedge fund strategies, and we denote the monthly return
of strategy i in month t by Ri. We calculate the cross-
sectional volatility across strategies as the square root of
the cross-sectional second moment:
(1)  cross-sectional volatility at time t =.
Cross-sectional covariance is defined as the average of
cross-sectional moments:
(2) cross-sectional covariance at time t=.
Cross-sectional correlation is the ratio of cross-sectional
covariance to the square of cross-sectional volatility. 
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that year,but only 2.09 percent afterward.The downward trend
since 2001 mirrors the pattern of other volatility measures in the
financial markets over the same period.
Absolute Value of Returns 
To see why the cross-sectional dispersion of returns is a supe-
rior gauge of hedge fund risk,consider an alternative measure:
the absolute value of returns on the Credit Suisse/Tremont
Hedge Fund Index (Chart 2).The absolute value of returns is a
measure of hedge fund volatility that increases with positive as
well as with negative returns.
As the chart shows,absolute values of returns were high in
the months preceding the LTCM crisis,but many other months
in the sample show similarly high or even higher levels of
volatility. For instance, the absolute value of the hedge fund
index was particularly high in December 1999, the month
before the millennium change.Thus,it appears that this meas-
ure is not as precise as our cross-sectional measure in distin-
guishing levels of risk.
Hedge Fund Return Comovement
How does the recent behavior of hedge fund returns contrast with
the behavior around the time of the LTCM crisis?  To explore this
question, we track the two measures of return comovement
defined in the introduction—covariances and correlations.
Recall that covariances are a measure of hedge fund comovement
in dollar terms;correlations are covariances divided by volatilities
(see box). An increase in correlations can stem either from an
increase in covariances or from a decrease in volatilities.6
The spike in cross-sectional volatility in August 1998,
depicted earlier in Chart 1,was accompanied by a large nega-
tive covariance of hedge fund returns (Chart 3).That is to say,
some strategies lost money while others profited.The covari-
ance then increased to a positive but not particularly high level
in September 1998 before declining to levels close to zero in
October and November.This pattern of covariances over time
indicates that hedge fund returns diverged significantly as 
markets reacted to the Russian default.The response by hedge
funds was a closing out of positions,leading to the September
increase in cross-sectional covariance.Thereafter,covariances
remained at fairly low levels,reflecting the reduced risk expo-
sures of the funds.
Chart 4 presents the cross-sectional correlation of hedge
fund returns together with the twelve-month moving aver-
age.The moving average was unusually high before the LTCM
crisis,and it has been increasing recently.However,a compar-
ison of Chart 4 with Charts 1 and 3 shows that the source of
4
Source: Author’s calculations, based on data from Credit Suisse/Tremont.
Note: Volatility is measured in percentages of monthly returns.
Chart 1
Cross-Sectional Volatility of Credit Suisse/Tremont 
Hedge Fund Returns
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Table 4
Summary Statistics for Cross-Sectional Moments
April 1994 to September 2006
Summary Statistic Volatility Correlation Covariance
Mean 2.66 0.11 0.81
Standard deviation 1.35 0.21 2.40
Minimum 0.78 -0.11 -9.74
Maximum 12.10 0.69 13.19
Correlation (Percent) Volatility Correlation Covariance
Volatility 100
Correlation -4 100
Covariance 12 67 100
Source:Author’s calculations,based on data from Credit Suisse/Tremont.
Note:The table reports summary statistics and correlations for the cross-sectional volatility,
correlation,and covariance of returns on Credit Suisse/Tremont hedge fund strategies.
Source: Author’s calculations, based on data from Credit Suisse/Tremont.
Note: Absolute value is measured in percentages of monthly returns.
Chart 2
Absolute Value of Credit Suisse/Tremont Hedge Fund 
Index Returns
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6Intuitively,when volatility decreases,the range of returns narrows,increasing
the tendency for correlations to be high.the elevated levels of hedge fund correlations before the
LTCM crisis differs from the source in recent months.
Whereas the current high level of correlations is associated
with an unusually low level of return volatility,the high level
of correlations prior to the LTCM crisis is associated with
unusually high covariances. Significantly, although the
covariance of hedge fund returns has increased in recent
months,the most recent twelve-month average of 0.32 is well
below the long-run average of 0.84—suggesting that current
covariance levels may not be alarmingly high.
Alternative Correlation Measures
Our finding that hedge fund correlations dropped to relatively
low levels during the LTCM crisis differs from results in the con-
tagion literature indicating that asset return correlations
increase during crises.Accordingly,one might wonder whether
our cross-sectional measure differs substantially from other
correlation measures. Most other measures of time-varying 
correlations are calculated as average pairwise correlations over
moving twelve-month periods.Chart 5 plots one such measure,
average correlation, together with the twelve-month average
cross-sectional correlation (our measure).7An additional meas-
ure in the chart is the explanatory power of a common factor in
hedge fund returns:the proportion of variance explained by the
first principal component.8
The chart reveals that the overall pattern of the alternative
correlation measures is similar to that of our measure: correla-
tions were high prior to the LTCM crisis,and have been rising
recently.However,there are some notable differences.The peak
in average correlation prior to the LTCM crisis occurred in July
1998,while our moving average of cross-sectional correlations
peaked in December 1996.More recently,average correlations
have increased since 2003,but cross-sectional correlations have
risen only since 2005.These differences suggest that the overall
evolution of the correlation measures is similar,even though the
precise timing varies somewhat.
Source: Author’s calculations, based on data from Credit Suisse/Tremont.
Note: Covariance is measured in percentages of monthly returns.
Chart 3
Cross-Sectional Covariance of Credit Suisse/Tremont 
Hedge Fund Returns
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Source: Author’s calculations, based on data from Credit Suisse/Tremont.
Chart 4
Cross-Sectional Correlation of Credit Suisse/Tremont 
Hedge Fund Returns
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7Garbaravicius and Dierick (2005) survey the recent literature on hedge funds
and financial stability; to our knowledge,they are the first to report rolling
correlations across hedge fund strategies as an indicator of risk.Chan et al.
(2005) explore a variety of indicators of systemic risk in the hedge fund sector.
McGuire,Remolona,and Tsatsaronis (2005) construct measures of hedge fund
leverage using rolling factor exposures of hedge fund returns.
8The first principal component is the linear combination of returns that best
explains the common variation among the returns.
Source: Author’s calculations, based on data from Credit Suisse/Tremont.
Note: The chart plots the twelve-month moving average of cross-sectional correlations 
across hedge fund returns together with the cross-sectional average of all pairwise 
twelve-month rolling correlations and the twelve-month rolling proportion of variance 
explained by the first principal component across hedge fund returns.
Chart 5
Forecasting Volatility
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The Temporal Relationship between Hedge Fund
Covariances and Risk
If the LTCM crisis was indeed preceded by elevated levels 
of hedge fund correlations,as our findings suggest,then it is 
reasonable to ask whether correlations predict volatilities—
volatilities being our preferred measure of hedge fund risk.
High correlations might indicate correlated exposures to under-
lying sources of risk,which in turn might raise the likelihood of
a crisis when a shock hits the financial markets.
Table 5 reports the results of our regressions of quarterly
hedge fund volatility on lags of itself as well as a combination of
lagged values of correlations and covariances.Columns 1 and 3
show no statistical relationship between correlations and future
volatilities.Significantly,columns 2 and 3 reveal that elevated
covariances do tend to precede increases in volatilities.
One can conclude from these results that the increase in
covariances—rather than the increase in correlations—was an
early indicator of the high volatility that took place during the
LTCM crisis.This conclusion is reasonable,because covariances
measure hedge fund return comovement in dollar terms while
correlations are covariances normalized by volatilities.System
risk can occur when returns in the hedge fund sector move sig-
nificantly in dollar terms; whether such movement is high or
low relative to the level of volatilities appears to be less relevant.
A further rise in covariances could thus be of some concern,but
the current high level of correlations does not appear to be a
strong predictor of future volatility.
A Comparison with Equity Market Comovement
Our finding that the onset of the LTCM event was not associated
with an increase in hedge fund correlations contrasts with other
results showing how asset returns behave during financial
crises.The literature on financial market contagion typically
finds an unusual increase in asset return correlations during
crises (see Claessens and Forbes [2001]). Contagion occurs
when risk aversion increases because of trading losses,possibly
owing to more binding financial constraints (see Kyle and
Xiong [2001]).The spillover effect from the Russian default to
the U.S.stock market in the summer of 1998 is a good example
of this type of contagion.
To put our findings in the proper perspective,we compare the
behavior of risk and comovement among hedge funds with that
of equity market returns.We create indicators of equity market
risk by calculating cross-sectional equity volatility and plotting
equity implied volatility derived from options prices.9 Equity
implied volatility peaked in September 1998,the month of the
LTCM recapitalization (Chart 6).Cross-sectional equity volatility
did not spike in either August or September 1998.Equity corre-
lations, however, showed a sharp peak above 60 percent in
August 1998 (Chart 7).
The behavior of equity correlations contrasts strongly with
that of hedge fund correlations during the LTCM crisis.As we
observed earlier,hedge fund correlations did not spike during
either the Russian default or the LTCM event.Taken together,
these results suggest that the investment strategies of hedge
6
Table 5
Dependence ofVolatility on Correlation and Covariance
April 1994 to September 2006
(1) (2) (3)
Volatility
Lag 1 0.28*** 0.33*** 0.25*
Lag 2 0.29** 0.24* 0.21*
Lag 3 -0.05 -0.03 -0.06
Correlation
Lag 1 -2.08 -1.89
Lag 2 0.23 -1.22
Lag 3 0.79 -0.10
Covariance
Lag 1 -0.12 -0.01
Lag 2 0.13* 0.19***
Lag 3 0.06 0.08
Constant 1.39** 1.18*** 1.73**
Source:Author’s calculations,based on data from Credit Suisse/Tremont.
Notes:The table reports regressions of the cross-sectional volatility on lags of cross-sectional
volatility,correlation,and covariance at a quarterly frequency.Standard errors are adjusted
for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity.
*Statistically significant at the 10 percent level.
**Statistically significant at the 5 percent level.
***Statistically significant at the 1 percent level.
9We use the equity implied volatility index of the Chicago Board Options
Exchange as a measure of equity implied volatility. Cross-sectional equity
volatility is measured for all traded stocks for each month.
Source: Author’s calculations, based on data from the Center for Research in Security 
Prices (CRSP) and the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE).
Notes: The chart plots the cross-sectional volatility of all stocks in the CRSP data set 
from January 1994 to December 2004 and the CBOE equity implied volatility index 
from January 1994 to October 2006. Equity implied volatility is annualized. 
Chart 6
Cross-Sectional Equity Volatility and Equity Implied Volatility
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investors.In particular,the spike in hedge fund cross-sectional
volatility in August 1998 illustrates the heterogeneity of hedge
fund investment strategies.In a related study,Boyson,Stahel,
and Stulz (2006) find no evidence of contagion between hedge
funds and market indicators—a result consistent with our
finding that spikes in correlations and volatilities in the equity
market do not coincide with those of hedge fund returns.
Conclusion
Our analysis of the relationship between hedge fund risk and
comovement of returns generally produces no statistical 
evidence that increases in hedge fund correlations precede rises
in hedge fund volatility. However, we do find that increases 
in hedge fund covariances tend to precede elevations in volatil-
ity.This result suggests that comovement measured in dollars—
covariance—is a more relevant indicator of risk than comove-
ment measured in correlation,that is,covariance normalized by
volatility.Recently,hedge fund covariance has increased,but it is
not at particularly high levels by historical standards. The
unusually high correlation among hedge funds in the current
environment is therefore attributable primarily to low hedge
fund volatility—a reflection of the generally low volatility of
financial assets.
We also find that the evolution of hedge fund risk and
comovement during the Long-Term Capital Management crisis
differed from the behavior of broad financial market returns.
While the correlations of financial assets such as equities
spiked at the same time as volatility shot up,hedge fund return
correlations were not unusually high at the beginning of the 
crisis and they declined sharply as it unfolded.This finding
reflects the diverse effects of the crisis on the outcomes of dif-
ferent hedge fund strategies:some hedge funds profited during
the event while others registered losses.
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Chart 7
Cross-Sectional Equity Correlation
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